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Abstract in English 
Recently, there has been considerable debate about a reform of the Dutch system of student 
support, in which grants will be (partly) replaced by loans. The discussion focuses on the effects 
on student enrollment decisions. Surprisingly, no study has yet analysed the effect of receiving 
a grant on parental contribution. Parents may decrease their contribution when their child 
receives a grant, in which case subsidies meant for the students unintentionally end up with the 
parents. Understanding the corresponding parental behaviour will contribute to a more in-depth 
discussion on the financial aid system. 
This paper focuses on the effect of the supplementary grant on the parental contribution in 
the Netherlands. The supplementary grant is meant to support students from disadvantaged 
families. Parents from students with the supplementary grant have less disposable income, 
which probably implies a lower contribution. Our identification strategy separates this income 
effect from the effect due to the payments of the supplementary grant. The results suggest 
substantial substitution. Each additional euro spent on supplementary grant reduces the parental 
contribution with approximately 20-60 cents. A broad range of sensitivity analyses support our 
main estimation results. Nevertheless, some caution in interpreting the results is needed because 
of data limitations. 
  
Key words: parental contribution, substitution, supplementary grant.   
Abstract in Dutch 
De hervorming van het Nederlandse systeem voor de studiefinanciering, waarbij studiebeurzen 
(gedeeltelijk) worden vervangen door leningen, is een recent onderwerp van het politieke debat. 
De discussie richt zich voornamelijk op de effecten op de deelname aan het hoger onderwijs. 
Verrassend genoeg zijn er geen studies die de effecten van beurzen op de ouderbijdrage hebben 
onderzocht. Het is mogelijk dat ouders hun bijdrage naar beneden bijstellen als hun kind een 
beurs krijgt. In dat geval zou een deel van de beurs onbedoeld terechtkomen bij de ouders. 
Inzicht in het gedrag van de ouders draagt bij aan de discussie over het systeem van 
studiefinanciering. 
Deze studie analyseert het effect van de aanvullende beurs op de ouderbijdrage in Nederland. 
Alleen studenten met minder draagkrachtige ouders hebben recht op de aanvullende beurs. Dit 
houdt in dat ouders van studenten met de aanvullende beurs een lager besteedbaar inkomen 
hebben, wat naar verwachting ook tot een lagere ouderbijdrage zal leiden. Onze analyse scheidt 
dit inkomenseffect van het effect ten gevolge van het toekennen van een aanvullende beurs. De 
resultaten suggereren aanzienlijke substitutie. Elke euro extra aan aanvullende beurs leidt tot 
een verminderde ouderbijdrage van ongeveer 20-60 cent. Hoewel al onze gevoeligheidsanalyses   4 
een zelfde beeld laten zien, is enige voorzichtigheid bij het interpreteren van de resultaten 
geboden vanwege beperkingen van de gebruikte data.  
 
Steekwoorden: ouderbijdrage, substitutie, aanvullende beurs. 
 




Summary  7 
1  Introduction  9 
2  The Dutch system of student support for higher education  11 
3  Empirical strategy  15 
4  Data description  19 
4.1  Cross-section data: Student Monitor  19 
4.2  Longitudinal data: Determinants of participation in higher education  24 
5  Main estimation results  26 
5.1  First approach: cross-section analysis  26 
5.1.1  Results Student Monitor  26 
5.1.2  Results Determinants of participation in higher education  29 
5.2  Second approach: longitudinal analysis  31 
5.2.1  Results Determinants of participation in higher education  31 
6  Sensitivity tests  33 
7  Heterogeneity checks  35 
8  Conclusion and discussion  37 
9  References  39   6   7 
Summary 
The Dutch government spends around one billion euros on grants for students in higher 
education per year. Recently, some political parties have proposed to introduce a loan system 
instead of the current student support system in which students receive grants. Abolishing (part 
of ) the subsidies would imply a substantial saving for the government. The discussion and 
current literature focuses on the effect of the financial aid system for students on the enrolment 
decision. Surprisingly, to our best knowledge, no study has analysed to what extent the students 
benefit from receiving grants. Grants are paid to the students, however, parents might decrease 
their parental contribution if the student receives a grant. In case of complete substitution 
parents decrease the parental contribution by exactly the size of the grant, implying that the 
subsidy that is meant for the student ends up with the parents.    
This paper analyses the effect of the supplementary grant on the parental contribution in the 
Netherlands. Only students from disadvantaged families can obtain this grant. The size of the 
supplementary grant depends on the financial capability of the parents (in other words, it is 
means-tested). The empirical problem in estimating the effect of the supplementary grant is that  
grants are not randomly assigned. It is expected that students with the supplementary grant get a 
lower contribution from their parents just because their parents have less disposable income. 
Our identification strategy must therefore separate this effect from the effect due to the 
payments of the supplementary grant. We use two identification strategies in which we make 
use of the eligibility rule for the grant to determine the effect of the supplementary grant on 
parental contribution. 
Our results indicate that parents decrease their contribution due to the payments of the 
supplementary grant. Each additional euro spent on supplementary grant reduces the financial 
parental contribution with approximately 20-40 cents. If we also take into account the direct 
payments of the parents - as some parents pay directly the tuition fees, books, rents etc instead 
of giving money - then we find that each additional euro reduces the parental contribution with 
approximately 60 cents. In other words, students keep only 40 cents of each euro they receive. 
Although some caution seems to be appropriate because of data limitations, all our sensitivity 
tests indicate substantial substitution and support our main estimation results.  
 
The degree of substitution seems larger for students that are more independent from their 
parents. We find that the degree of substitution is larger for students that live independently 
from their parents, compared with students that live with their parents. Likewise, the degree of 
substitution is higher for senior students than for freshmen.  
   8 
Our findings point to an inefficiency in the system of providing financial aid to disadvantaged 
students as substantial substitution effects imply that subsidies that are meant for students 
unintentionally end up with parents. Our results contribute to a more profound discussion on 
supplying grants.    9 
1  Introduction 
In many countries the funding of higher education is a topic of considerable political debate. In 
the Unites States billions of dollars are spent on subsidies for college students each year. The 
Dutch government yearly spends around one billion euros on grants for students. Some political 
parties in the Netherlands have recently proposed to introduce a loan system instead of the 
current student support system. Decreasing or abolishing the subsidies would imply a 
substantial saving for the government which may help restoring public budgets. Opponents of 
adjustments in the current system, however, argue that smaller subsidies may result in lower 
participation in higher education. 
 
The discussion mainly focuses on the effects of financial aid for students on enrolment 
decisions. A large literature analyses this effect (see, for example, McPherson and Schapiro  
(1991), Van der Klaauw (2002), Dynarski (2003), Linsenmeier, Rosen and Rouse (2006), and 
Canton and De Jong (2005) for the Netherlands). Surprisingly, in the current literature on 
financial aid for students, the role of the parents has not been analysed. To our knowledge no 
study has yet investigated the effects of receiving subsidies on parental contribution. 
Understanding the corresponding parental contribution may valuably contribute to the public 
debate on supplying grants. In case parents decrease the parental contribution if their child 
receives a grant, then providing grants to students implicitly boils down to subsidising the 
parents to some extent.   
 
This paper analyses the effect of grants on the parental contribution. Hence, we are essentially 
investigating how much parents would have given to their children if their child had not 
received the grant. In order to identify this effect we focus on the supplementary grant in the 
Netherlands. In the Netherlands, students can basically apply for two kinds of financial aid: the 
basic grant and the supplementary grant. The basic grant applies, roughly speaking, for all 
students, while only students from disadvantaged backgrounds can apply for the supplementary 
grant.  The empirical problem in estimating the effect of the supplementary grant on parental 
contribution is that this grant is not randomly assigned; receiving a grant might be correlated 
with both observable and unobservable factors. Differences in unobservable characteristics 
between students with a supplementary grant and students without a supplementary grant may 
bias the estimation results. We use two different identification strategies that make use of the 
eligibility rule for the grant to determine the effect of the supplementary grant on parental 
contribution.  
 
Our main analysis uses a dataset that consists of administrative data on the supplementary 
grants and self-reported data on parental contribution for the years 2005 through 2009. We find 
that obtaining a supplementary grant reduces the parental contribution. Each additional euro on   10 
supplementary grant reduces the financial parental contribution with approximately 20-40 cents. 
When we also take into account the direct payments of the parents - as some parents pay 
directly the tuition fees, books, rents etc instead of giving money - an even larger effect is 
found. Then, each additional euro the student receives on supplementary grant reduces the 
parental contribution with approximately 60 cents. This result suggests substantial substitution 
effects related to providing financial aid to students, which implies that subsidies meant for the 
students unintentionally end up with the parents to some extent. If the goal of the supplementary 
grant is to support the students from disadvantaged families (and possibly in that way enhancing 
the accessibility to higher education), then our empirical findings suggest that this system is 
partly ineffective.  
We perform a broad set of sensitivity analyses that all yield similar results and support our main 
findings. Nevertheless, as we rely on self-reported data and cannot completely rule out potential 
selection effects, some caution in interpreting the results seems appropriate. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the current system of student 
support in the Netherlands. In section 3 we present our empirical strategy. Section 4 describes 
the data and the main results are presented in section 5. The sensitivity tests can be found in 
section 6. Section 7 determines and discusses the effect of the supplementary grants for 
subgroups, such as male versus female. Finally, section 8 concludes and discusses the 
implications of our findings.   11 
2  The Dutch system of student support for higher 
education 
The current Dutch system of student support is based on the idea that the income of the students 
that is not generated from work consists of three components: the basic grant, the parental 
contribution and a loan. In addition students from disadvantaged backgrounds can receive a 
supplementary grant. The regulation of the Dutch system of support has been written down in 
the Student Finance Act (2000). 
Basic grant 
All students, younger than 30 which are registered at an institute for higher education (higher 
vocational education (“HBO”) or university education (“WO”)) and earn less than 
approximately 10 thousand euro a year, are eligible for the basic scholarship during the nominal 
length of their study (4-6 years).
1 The amount of the basic scholarship depends on the living 
situation of the student. That is, students that live independently from their parents receive 
about 3 times as much as students that live with their parents. Table 2.1 shows the exact size of 
the basic grant for the years 2005-2009. Clearly, as shown in table 2.1, the government 
marginally adjusts the amounts each year. The scholarship is conditional on graduating within 
10 years. If the student fails to meet this criterion, the total sum received must be repaid with 
interest. 
Table 2.1  Basic scholarships 
  Living situation student 
Basic scholarship (p/month in € )  at parental home  independent 
-   2005  76      233 
-   2006  89  248 
-   2007  91  253 
-   2008   92  256 
-   2009  93  260 
 
 
Parental contribution and the supplementary grant 
On a yearly basis, the Dutch government estimates a „standard amount‟ that students are 
expected to receive from their parents. This standard amount depends on the living situation of 
the student. Table 2.2 gives the standard amounts for the years 2005-2009. Although parents are 
expected to provide at least the standard amount to their children, they are free to donate more 
or less in practice. 
 
1  Special additional criteria apply to students that do not have the Dutch nationality.      12 
Table 2.2  Standard amount (=maximum supplementary grant) 
  Living situation student 
Standard amount (p/month in € )  at parental home  independent 
-   2005 
a  203  221 
-   2006  207  226 
-   2007  204  224 
-   2008  209  228 
-   2009  212  231 
     
a In 2005, the standard amount also depended on the kind of medical insurance. The average standard amount is 
shown. 
 
A student that is eligible for the basic grant can apply for the supplementary grant when he 
believes that his parents are financially unable to pay the standard amount. In that case the 
government determines the exact parental financial capability, as eligibility to the 
supplementary grant and the size of the grant (in case of eligibility) is based on this capability. 
The financial capability is mainly determined by the gross aggregated income of the parents. 
Other components that are taken into account are the number of siblings at high school and 
higher education. If the financial capability is insufficient, then the student receives a 
supplementary grant. Around 30% of the students currently receives a supplementary grant 
(Vossensteyn, 2008). 
 
The size of the grant is determined as follows. Based on parental financial capability the 
government first determines the corresponding amount that they should be able to donate to 
their child, indicated as the „affordable amount of parental contribution‟. The affordable amount 
increases with the parental gross income and decreases with the number of siblings that are at 
high school or higher education. This is graphically illustrated in the left part of figure 2.1, 
where the „1 student‟ and „2 students‟ lines indicate the affordable parental contribution for 
parents that have 1 child or 2 children at higher education respectively. In general, the slope of 
the „1 student line‟ flattens if the parents have more children enrolled at higher education, and 
the line shifts outward if they have more children at high school (not shown in the figure).  
Figure 2.1  Affordable parental contribution and size of supplementary grant   13 
The size of the supplementary grant is consequently calculated as the difference between the 
standard amount and the affordable amount. Hence, the supplementary grant fills the gap 
between the standard amount and affordable amount, to ensure that students can obtain the 
standard amount of money. This is illustrated in the right figure. This system implies that there 
is some variation in the size of the supplementary grant. The supplementary grant is at least a 
couple of cents (in which case the affordable amount is nearly as high as the standard amount) 
and at most equal to the level of the standard amount. The first year of the supplementary grant 
is a gift independent of educational achievement. The other years are only converted into a gift 
if the student graduates within 10 years.  
 
Figure 2.2 shows the maximum yearly gross aggregated parental income at which a student is 
eligible to receive the supplementary grant. More precisely, we show the corresponding gross 
parental income for students that live independently from their parents and receive a 
supplementary grant of €1. The horizontal axis gives the total number of children at high school 
and higher education and the vertical axis shows the corresponding gross parental income for 
the year 2009. The results for the other years are similar (not shown). Clearly, eligibility to the 
supplementary grant is influenced by the family composition. 
 
Figure 2.2  Maximum yearly gross parental income (in year 2009) 
 
Loan  
In addition to these grants students can borrow from the government till three years after 
eligibility for the basic grant. The maximum amount that students can borrow depends on the 
amount that the student receives from the supplementary grant. That is, the received amount of 
this grant is deducted from the maximum loan. Similar to grants, the maximum loan depends on 
the living situation of the student and is marginally adjusted each year.   14   15 
3  Empirical strategy 
In order to estimate the effect of the supplementary grant on the parental contribution, we can 
regress the parental contribution on the level of the supplementary grant, taking into account 
observable differences between students ( i X ). Accordingly,  
 
(1)  0 1 2 i i i i PC S X          
with i PC  the parental contribution of student i,  i S  the level of the supplementary grant, and i X  
a vector of observable control variables. Estimation of regression (1) with ordinary least-
squares (OLS) yields the causal effect of the supplementary grant in case the allocation of the 
grants is not correlated with unobservable characteristics of the students that influence the level 
of the parental contribution. This means that the provision of the supplementary grant can, 
while taking into account the observable differences of students, be seen as random. In the 
literature this is called the „unconfoundedness assumption‟ (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
The empirical problem in estimating the effect of the supplementary grant on parental 
contribution is that grants are not randomly assigned; receiving a grant might be correlated with 
both observable and unobservable factors. Differences in unobservable characteristics between 
students with a supplementary grant and students without a supplementary grant may bias the 
estimation results. This is why unconfoundedness is generally considered to be a strong 
identification assumption. 
In our case, however, the eligibility rule for the supplementary grant may contribute to the 
credibility of the unconfoudedness assumption. Eligibility depends on the financial capability of 
the parents (see section 2), which is mainly determined by gross aggregate income. Students 
with parents below a certain threshold level of income (I*) are eligible for the grant, while 
students with parents above this level of income are not eligible. In addition, the size of the 
grant for eligible students depends on parental income. Hence, parental income is the most 
important underlying variable determining the amount of supplementary grant a student 
receives.  
In our first approach we rely on the unconfoundedness assumption in a cross-section regression 
in which we control for a flexible function of parental income. We estimate the following 
equation by OLS: 
 
(2)  0 1 2 3 () i i i i i PC S f I X            
   16 
where  (.) f  is a smooth polynomial function andI is the net parental income. The 
unconfoundedness assumption seems reasonably valid when we control for a smooth 
polynomial of parental income. Obviously, for a causal interpretation of the estimated 
coefficient β1 we need that there exists a continuous relationship between parental income and 
parental contribution. After all, in case of misspecification of the functional form, part of the 
effect of income on parental contribution might be picked up by the coefficient for the 
supplementary grant. It seems, however, most plausible to assume a continuous relationship, in 
which case the smooth polynomial function will completely pick up the income effect.  
 
To further reduce potential endogeneity problems that might violate our identification 
assumption, we also perform analyses that focus on a narrower sample around the threshold 
income level for eligibility to the grant. Students around the threshold income of being eligible 
seem comparable as students cannot exercise precise control over the assignment of the 
treatment (Lee, 2008). That is, students do not determine the wage of their parents, nor do 
parents base their income decision on the corresponding size of the supplementary grant. 
Students on one side of the cut-off were just „lucky‟ to obtain the treatment while students on 
the other side did not. Students further away from the cut-off seem less similar as the income 
difference increases. Therefore focussing on a narrower window reduces the risk of an incorrect 
specification bias, but has the disadvantage of a loss of efficiency (Van der Klaauw, 2008).  
 
Ideally we would have followed the exact identification strategy of the recent innovative studies 
of Card et al. (2009) and Simonsen et al. (2010) who have introduced the regression kink design 
to determine the effect of kinked treatment functions. The size of the supplementary grant is a 
kinked function of parental income (see the right panel of figure 2.1). The regression kink 
design exploits the shift in slopes, rather than the shift in levels as done in regression 
discontinuity analyses (Hahn et al., 2001). Data limitations, however, prevent us from using our 
preferred identification strategy. That is, we only dispose of self-reported data on classes of 
income levels of the parents which makes it difficult to use a kink point for identification. In 
addition, we cannot perfectly determine the precise cut-off level of the parental income of 
individual students, as we lack data on the number of siblings of the students (see section 4).  
 
Although model (2) controls for the single most important variable determining eligibility and 
the size of the grant, we can think of two potential sources of bias in estimating the effect of the 
supplementary grant. First of all, not all students that are eligible for the grants do actually 
apply for it. There may be unobservable differences between the group of students that is 
eligible and applies for the grant and the group of students that is eligible but does not apply. 
The standard approach to deal with this concern would be an instrumental variables technique 
(see for instance Angrist and Pischke, 2009), in which receiving a grant is instrumented by a 
variable for eligibility. However, this is not feasible to us because of the data limitations   17 
discussed above. We address this possible bias performing two sensitivity checks (see section 
6). Firstly, we restrict the sample to students from low-income families. All students in this 
group should be eligible to the supplementary grant. In case unconfoundedness holds we expect 
to find similar results. Secondly, we restrict the sample to students that receive the 
supplementary grant. Finding similar results for this subgroup of students that all applied and 
received the grant, using only variation in the size of the supplementary grant, suggests that 
non-appliers do not bias the estimations.  
 
Our second concern, and probably more important, is that the number of siblings of a student 
may be correlated with both the size of the grant and the parental contribution. That is, it is 
plausible to believe that parents with more children donate each child somewhat less. At the 
same time, from the assignment rule for the supplementary grant it follows that the size of the 
grant increases with the number of siblings. Therefore, not controlling for the number of 
siblings might give a downwards bias on the estimated effect of the supplementary grant on the 
parental contribution. Our second approach, in which we make use of panel data, aims to 
address this problem. 
 
Our second identification strategy is an extension of our first approach. By using data 
containing two successive years for each student, one can estimate 
(3)  , 0 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , , () i t i t i t i t i t i t PC S f I PC X               
where (PCi,t-1) indicates the size of the parental contribution of the previous year. In contrast 
with our first identification, this model additionally controls for the lagged value of the parental 
contribution (PCi,t-1). We can interpret this variable as a measure for individual fixed effects. 
Some families just prefer to donate to their child more or less, potentially caused by the family 
composition. Specially, assuming that a student‟s number of siblings remains constant, not 
observing the number of siblings does not bias the estimation results in this specification. The 
data set needed for this approach, however, also has its limitations (see section 4). As it only 
contains parental income in the first year, we cannot include parental income (Ii,t). Therefore, 
we include lagged parental income in (3) instead of current parental income. This should be a 
reasonable proxy assuming a low year-to-year variation in parental income. However, if 
specification (2) is correct, we would not expect to find an effect of lagged parental income 
conditional on lagged parental contribution. We will present results of model (3) both with and 
without inclusion of lagged parental income.  Our second approach, using panel data. can be 
considered as a robustness analysis in which we address the issue of missing information on the 
number of siblings.  
 
   18   19 
4  Data description 
For our empirical analyses we employ two datasets. The first dataset, the so-called „Student 
Monitor‟, consists of cross-section data of students. These data have been extended with 
administrative information on the grants that students have obtained. These data are suitable for 
the first identification strategy and will be described in section 4.1. Our second dataset, named 
„Determinants of participation in higher education‟, is collected by SEO - SCO Kohnstamm 
Institute of the University of Amsterdam. This dataset can be used for both identification 
strategies as it disposes of longitudinal data. We describe this dataset in section 4.2. 
4.1  Cross-section data: Student Monitor 
Our first dataset is the Student Monitor extended with administrative data that includes 
information about the size of the grants. The Student Monitor is a yearly large-scale survey held 
among students enrolled in higher education, financed by the Ministry of Education. Students 
are asked a large set of questions related to their life and study. We use the surveys of years 
2005 through 2009. These 5 surveys gathered cross-section information about the student‟s 
personal characteristics (age, gender, marital status, living situation, etc), the student‟s 
educational position (level of higher education, sector, number of studies, etc) and 
socioeconomic background characteristic (parental income, education level and occupation of 
the parents). Each survey also included information on the parental contribution.     
 
For the questions regarding the parental contribution, students were asked to report the monthly 
financial parental contribution. As some parents might pay bills of the student directly, like the 
tuition fee, the rents, insurance, etc, students were also explicitly asked about these kinds of 
contributions. Based on this information we construct two dependent variables: the financial 
parental contribution and the total parental contribution. The financial parental contributions 
(FPCi) are the monthly financial contributions of the parents. The total parental contribution 
(TPCi) is the financial parental contribution plus the monthly direct payment of the parents (for 
rents, tuition fees, etc).    
 
The main explanatory variable in our analysis is the size of the supplementary grant. This 
variable is administratively obtained and gives the monthly level of the supplementary grants, 
which can be as high as the standard amount and as low as zero (in which case the student does 
not receive the supplementary grant). The monthly net parental income is the most important 
control variable. In all 5 surveys this variable is measured on a 8 point scale: no income; less 
than 700 euro; between 700-1400; between 1400-2100; between 2100-2800; between 2800-  20 
3500; between 3500-4200; more than 4200 euro a month.
2 We use the midpoints of the ranges 
as estimator for the income of the parents. For the category „more than 4200 euros‟ we follow 
the method used by Card and DiNardo (2002) who multiply censored earnings by 1.4. That is, 
we set the category equal to €5880. Students could choose to report the aggregated monthly net 
income of the parents, or to report the income of the mother and father separately (in which case 
the sum gives the aggregated net monthly income). We focus our analyses on the students that 
report both the income of the mother and father. These observations contain more information 
since more income classes are possible (26 
3 instead of 8). If the income level of one of the 
parents is missing then we exclude the observation. 
 
Other covariates we use are the personal characteristics of the students (age, gender, ethnic 
group, living situation, marital status), their educational position (level of higher education, 
sector of education, years in intermediate/higher education, number of studies enrolled) and the 
socio economic background characteristics (occupation and employment parents, years of 
education parents, county of origin parents). Except for age and gender that have been obtained 
from administrative data, the data are self-reported. Age might be important as a decrease of the 
parental contribution typically occurs when the student gets older. Likewise, all other personal 
characteristics, the educational position of the student and the socioeconomic background 
characteristics might influence the level of the parental contribution.  
 
In total, more than 50 thousand students responded to one of the five surveys (approximately 10 
thousand a year). We limit the sample to students that are eligible for the basic grant, as 
students that are ineligible for the basic grant are automatically also ineligible for the 
supplementary grant. In total 35119 respondents are eligible for the basic grant and 18055 of 
these students report their parental contribution and parental income.
4 Leaving out students that 
report an exceptional (unrealistic) high monthly total parental contributions of more than €1500, 
 
2 As we only dispose of self-reported income categories, we probably have measurement error in our parental income 
variable. Although we are not interested in obtaining a causal estimate for the effect of income, this still might be a concern 
in our analyses. If observed income differs from true income, there will be variation in true income that is contained in the 
error term. This may cause correlation between the error term and the supplementary grant, which is based on true income. 





   minus overlapping categories  (for instance between 1400-2100 (=1750) plus between 2100-2800 (=2450) equals 
4200. The sum of the parental income is also equal to 4200 if the student reports between 700-1400 (=1050) and between 
2800-3500(=3150)).  
 
4 We necessarily have to restrict our sample to students that report both parental contribution and income. This leaves us 
with a substantially smaller estimation sample compared to the total sample size of 35119 eligible students. This might give 
rise to concerns on the external validity of our estimation results, if our estimation sample would contain a selective group of 
students. We have compared descriptive statistics for students in our estimation sample and the students that are not in our 
estimation sample and find that both groups are well comparable on characteristics like age, gender, ethnicity, education 
level, living status and parental education. This suggests that sample selection is not really a concern for our analyses.      21 
gives us 17745 students. The restriction excludes less than 2% of the sample. Of these students 
5694 reported the aggregated income of the parents, and 12051 the income of the mother and 
father separately. As the last group contains more information, we use this group as our main 
estimation sample. The students that report the aggregated parental income are used in a 
sensitivity test.  
Figure 4.1 shows the histograms of our two dependent variables for our estimation sample 
separately for students without and with the supplementary grant. The histogram of the financial 
parental contribution is shown in figure (a), and figure (b) shows the histogram of the total 
parental contribution. A remarkable proportion of the students receive no (financial or total) 
parental contribution. The proportion of students that receive no parental contribution is higher 
for the students that receive the supplementary grant than for the students that do not receive the 
supplementary grant. 
Figure 4.1  Histogram of financial and total parental contribution 













Table 4.1 gives the sample means and standard deviations of the parental contribution and the 
average size of the supplementary grant for our estimation sample. The monthly financial 
parental contribution for students that do not receive the supplementary grant is €148. Adding 
the direct payments gives a total parental contribution of €375. If we compare the financial 
contribution with the standard amount shown in table 2.2 we observe that the average financial 
contribution is lower than the standard amount. Adding the direct payments shows that average 
total parental contribution is higher, though.    
   22 
Table 4.1  Average (financial/total) parental contribution and size of supplementary grant  (N=12051) 
Year  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2005-2009 
           
Students without S (N=8364)            
FPC (p/month in €)  138 (157)  156 (168)  145 (164)  150 (167)  149 (174)  148 (166) 
TPC (p/month in €)  359 (247)  396 (269)  379 (259)  380 (255)  359 (267)  375 (260) 
S (p/month in €)  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
             
Students with S (N=3687)             
FPC (p/month in €)  58 (115)  59 (114)  51 ( 98)  50 (104)  46 ( 97)  54 (107) 
TPC (p/month in €)  169 (194)  167 (191)  154 (186)  151 (175)  136 (193)  157 (184) 
S (p/month in €)  162 ( 68)   170 ( 68)  170 ( 67)  173 ( 67)  176 ( 70)  170 ( 68) 
             
Standard deviations in parentheses.   
 
The average monthly financial contribution for students with the supplementary grant is €54, 
the total parental contribution €157, and the average size of the supplementary grant €170. This 
gives a total income of €327 (TPC+S). Note that this is a smaller amount than the average total 
parental contribution for students without the supplementary grant, but higher than the standard 
amount.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the covariates are shown in table 4.2. The first column reports the 
descriptive statistics for the students that do not receive the supplementary grant, while the 
second reports them for the students with the supplementary grant. It turns out that students 
with the supplementary grant are more often from an ethnic minority group, less often enrolled 
in university education, and have lower general socioeconomic background characteristics. 
Their parents earn less, have had less education, are less often employed, and have more often 
occupations for which no training is needed. In our regressions we additionally control for age 
squared and the living situation of the student (student house, at landlady, etc).  
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Table 4.2  Descriptive statistics of covariates (N=12051) 
  Without S  With S 
Personal characteristics         
Age    21.2   (2.07)  21.6   (2.30) 
Female (%)  53       55   
University education (%)   64    53   
Ethnic minority (%)   10    24   
Lives independent from parents (%)  64     60   
Marital status: % single 
a   90    88   
Student had no child (%) 
b  99    99   
         
Educational position student         
Years in intermediate/higher education (MBO/HBO/WO)              2.9  ( 1.41)   2.8  (1.41) 
Enrolled for >1 study (%) 
   6    6   
Sector of education:   % agriculture    9      9   
                                   % behaviour & society  13    15   
                                   % economics   12      11   
                                   % education  4    6   
                                   % health care  19     17     
                                   % language & culture  12    12   
                                   % law  5    5   
                                   % nature    10     8   
                                   % technique   16       16   
         
Socio economic background         
Net monthly parental income (income mother + father)  4490   (2151)  2248   (1393) 
Year of education mother 
c   12.7   (2.71)  11.0    (2.90) 
Year of education father 
c  13.7   (2.94)  11.5   (3.10) 
Employment mother: % employed  
d   76     56     
Employment father: % employed 
d    90    69   
Level of occupation mother: % unskilled, untrained job 
e  5    15   
Level of occupation father:  % unskilled, untrained  job 
e  2    8   
Country of origin mother: % the Netherlands 
e   89    75   
Country of origin father: % the Netherlands
 f  89    73   
 
a The other categories are: married/unmarried partners, and divorced/widowed 
b The other categories are : 1 child, 2 children, more than 2 children 
c Education is in the survey a categorical variable. In this table we assign years to all categories and show the average 
and standard deviation. For the regressions in section 5 we use the initial categories.   
d The other categories are: Unemployed, Not suitable for employment, Unknown/na 
e  Students could choose between 9 categories, ranging from unskilled to high intellectual. If the parent was 
unemployed, then students were asked to report the level of the last occupation.   
f The other categories are: Surinam, Antilles (inclusive Aruba), Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, Other, Unknown/na 
 
Standard deviations in parentheses.   
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4.2  Longitudinal data: Determinants of participation in higher education 
This dataset consists of two cohorts, the 1995 cohort and the 1997 cohort. For the 1995 cohort a 
survey was held among freshmen enrolled in higher education in the academic year 1995-1996 
(henceforth year 1). The follow-up survey gathered information one year later about the 
academic year 1996-1997 (henceforth year 2). The 1997 cohort also consists of information 
about freshmen at two different points in time: for „year 1‟ a survey was held right after the 
beginning of the academic year 1997-1998 and for „year 2‟ roughly one year later about the 
academic year 1998-1999 (Belot et al., 2006). The two major differences between this dataset 
and the dataset of the Student Monitor are i) this dataset includes information about two 
successive points in times, and ii) this dataset is not extended with administrative data.  
 
The surveys of both years include a question on the monthly financial parental contribution. No 
questions were asked about the indirect payments of the parents. Therefore, for our main 
dependent variable we use the financial parental contribution only. Besides this type of income, 
students were also asked to report the size of the basic grant, supplementary grant, contribution 
of a partner, net wage, income from social security, income from other sources, and the total 
income (that should be equal to the sum of the individual components). We impute missing 
values for the supplementary grant and financial parental contribution as zero only in case the 
sum of the individual components of income are equal (or higher) than the reported total 
income. 
 
For our first identification strategy, defined in equation (2), we use the data of year 1. This is 
because our main control variable, the parental income, is only reported in the first surveys of 
both cohorts. We focus on students that report the income of the parents separately. For both 
parents the income is reported in ranges
5 and we use the midpoints of the ranges (except for the 
highest category that is multiplied by 1.4). The estimator of the parental income is the sum of 
the income of the mother and father. Within this dataset we use the following covariates: age, 
age squared, gender, living situation, level and sector of education, ethnic group, country of 
origin and education level of the parents. 
 
In total, 8726 students responded to the survey of year 1 (4412 students in the 1995 cohort and 
4314 students in the 1997 cohort). Restricting the sample to students that are eligible to the 
basic grant - this implies that we exclude students with missing or zero values for the basic 
grant - leaves us with 6736 students (3671 for cohort 1995 and 3065 for cohort 1997).Within 
this group, 3929 students report the size of the supplementary grant, parental income and 
 
5  For cohort 1995 the categories are:  0, <1500, 1500-1750, 1750-2000. 2000-2250, 2250-2500, 2500-3000, 3000-3500, 
3500-4000, 4000-4500, 4500-5000, 5000-5500, >5500. In the 1997 cohort, the last two categories (5000-5500  and >5500) 
are replaced by: 5000-6000, 6000-7000, 7000-8000, >8000.    25 
financial parental contribution. Leaving out students that report an unrealistically high monthly 
financial parental contribution of more than €650 and/or an unrealistic high supplementary 
grant of more than €220, gives 3902 students. This last restriction excludes less than 1% of the 
sample. That is, our estimation sample for our first identification strategy consists of 2362 
students for cohort 1995 and 1540 students for cohort 1997.  
 
Our second identification strategy additionally requires that students responded to the follow-up 
survey, were still eligible for the basic grant in that year, and reported realistic values for the 
size of the supplementary and financial parental contribution. In total, 1806 respondents meet 
all these conditions: 1192 for the 1995 cohort and 614 for the 1997 cohort.    26 
5  Main estimation results 
This section discusses the results for both identification strategies. Section 5.1 presents the 
results of the cross-section analyses. In section 5.1.1 we use the dataset of the Student Monitor, 
and in section 5.1.2 the dataset „Determinants of participation in higher education‟. Section 5.2 
shows the results for our second identification strategy. For our second identification strategy 
we only use the dataset „Determinants of participation in higher education‟, as longitudinal data 
are needed.  
 
5.1  First approach: cross-section analysis 
5.1.1  Results Student Monitor 
The key for our first identification strategy, defined in equation (2), is that we control for the 
parental income. Therefore, we first consider the average size of the supplementary grant for 
every possible income class. If students report the parental income correctly, then it is expected 
- from the rules about the assignment of the supplementary grant - that the size of the 
supplementary grant decreases with an increase of the parental income. The left panel of figure 
5.1 shows the average size of the supplementary grant for every possible income class. As 
shown, the average supplementary grant is approximately zero for monthly net parental income 
levels of €4900 or higher. Hence, the figure suggests that the cut-off of being eligible for the 
supplementary grant is at about €4900. The figure also shows two regression lines, one 
estimated for the students below the cut-off, and one for students above the cut-off.     
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Importantly, the left panel illustrates a decrease of the supplementary grant with an increase in 
parental income. Two remarks on this figure are in order. Firstly, the average size of the 
supplementary grant should be zero for students that have parents with high income, while it is 
somewhat higher than zero. Apparently, some students misreport the parental income (recall 
that the information about the grants is administratively obtained). Secondly, students seem to 
overestimate the parental income. Large families (3 students and 3 children at higher school) 
are ineligible for the supplementary grant if the yearly gross aggregated parental income is more 
than ±€70000 (see figure 2.2), which corresponds to a monthly net income of somewhat below  
€4000.
6 The maximum gross aggregated parental income that allows receiving the 
supplementary grant is smaller for students from smaller families. Hence, from the rules about 
the assignment of the supplementary grant, we would expect to find a cut-off somewhat below 
€4000.   
 
The right panel of figure 5.1 gives the parental contribution as function of the parental income. 
It also presents two OLS regression lines, one for students below the cut-off of €4900 and one 
for students above the cut-off. The figure shows that the relationship between the parental 
income and parental contribution changes when we cross the cut-off income level. The dotted 
lines show the expected parental contribution if the student had not obtained the supplementary 
grant. It seems that, due to the supplementary grant, parents decrease their contribution more 
than can be explained from the decrease in income. The figure suggests the presence of 
substitution. It should be noted that the figure gives just a first impression as the covariates are 
excluded. In addition the figure assumes a linear function for the income, while a more flexible 
functional form might be more appropriate.  
 
Table 5.1 presents the results for our first identification strategy. The first row shows the 
estimated coefficients for the supplementary grant in the regression with the financial parental 
contribution as dependent variable. The second row presents the estimated coefficients in the 
analyses with total parental contribution as dependent variable. In the first column we regress 
the parental contribution on only the supplementary grant and dummy year variables. Column 2 
additionally includes the control variables. Column 3 adds the parental income and in column 4 
a third order polynomial of the parental income is also included. Note that column 2 is the 
model presented in equation (1) and column 4 the model presented in equation (2). 
 
 
6  The exact size of the corresponding net monthly income depends on many factors, like having a lease car or not, the 
exact year, renting or owning a house, etc.      28 
Table 5.1  Effect of supplementary grant on parental contribution (N=12051) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental contribution         
Financial    -0.517***    -0.278***    -0.235***    -0.230*** 
    (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.018)    (0.018) 
         
Total    -1.196***    -0.715***    -0.611***    -0.597*** 
    (0.025 )    (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.029) 
         
Control  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Parental income  NO  NO  LINEAR  POLYNOMIAL 
         
* Significant at a 10% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include year dummies.  
 
The estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant in all specifications. The 
effects decrease (in absolute value) when more control variables are added to the model. In the 
full model, including all control variables, the effect of receiving a supplementary grant on the 
financial parental contribution is -0.23.
7 This implies that every additional euro supplementary 
grant reduces the financial contribution of the parents with 23 cents. The substitution effect is 
larger when we consider the effect for the total parental contribution. The estimation results in 
the full model show that total parental contribution decreases with around 60 cents for every 
additional euro supplementary grant. Our findings suggest that the subsidy meant for the 
students is implicitly passed on to the parents to some extent.  
 
In order to further decrease potential endogeneity problems in our estimations, we also focus 
our analyses on a narrower window. Table 5.2 shows the estimation results of some regression 
analyses in which we focus on a narrower subsample of students around the cut-off of being 
eligible for the supplementary grant. The first column shows our initial full model estimate. 
Subsequently we narrow the window to the income class €4900 plus minus €3000 (column 2) 
and plus minus €1000 (column 3). We find similar results for narrower windows around the cut-
off of being eligible. In the last regression we exploit the data points at the cut-off, that is, we 
estimate the results for students that report an income class of €4900. Even in that case the 
estimates remain in the same ballpark, although the standard errors increase strongly due too the 
smaller sample size. Our findings support the credibility of the unconfoundedness assumption 
and improve the internal validity of the results.  
 
 
7 In the full model, including a polynomial function of income, both the estimated coefficients for the second and third order 
income variables are significantly different from zero.   29 
Table 5.2  Effect of supplementary grant on parental contribution for samples near the cut-off 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental contribution         
Financial    -0.230***    -0.234***    -0.231***    -0.157 
    (0.018)    (0.023)    (0.061)    (0.131) 
         
Total    -0.597***    -0.627***    -0.688***    -0.770*** 
    (0.029)    (0.037)    (0.096)    (0.209) 
         
N  12051  9321  3229  902 
Income class   Initial regression  4900±3000  4900±1000  4900 
         
* Significant at a 10% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include covariates including the polynomial function of the parental income, and year dummies.  
         
 
5.1.2  Results Determinants of participation in higher education  
 
In line with the analysis of the Student Monitor, we start by presenting the average size of the 
supplementary grant for every possible income class (see figure 5.2). Note first of all, that this 
dataset contains more income classes than the Student Monitor. The number of observations for 
each income class ranges from 1 to 246. This explains some of the apparent outliers, as they 
represent very few observations. As shown, the average supplementary grant is approximately 
zero for parental income levels of €2800 or higher. This seems to correspond well with the 
assignment rules for the supplementary grant. The maximum gross aggregated parental income 
at which large families (3 students and 3 children at high school) are eligible was about €50000 
a year
8, which implies a monthly net income of about €2800. We also show two regression 
lines, one for the respondents below the cut-off value of €2800, and one for the respondents 
above the cut-off.  
 
The right panel of figure 5.2 illustrates the financial parental contribution as function of the 
parental income with corresponding regression lines. The dotted line shows the expected 
financial parental contribution if the student would not receive the supplementary grant. The 






8  Source: Informatie Beheer groep (1995).    30 




Table 5.3 shows the estimates of the effect of the supplementary grant on the financial parental 
contribution. Similar to the results of the Student Monitor, the estimated coefficients are 
significant negative in all specifications and decrease (in absolute value) when more control 
variables are added to the model. In the full model the effect of receiving an additional euro on 
supplementary grant reduces the financial parental contribution with 40 cents. This suggests an 
even higher degree of substitution compared the results of the Student Monitor (-0.40 compared 
to -0.23). This difference might be due to differences in sampling, data collection, or time 
period. We checked whether the difference occurred due to the difference in the number of 
included covariates. When we restrict the covariates of the Student Monitor to the same ones as 
used in table 5.3, then we find an estimated effect of -0.24. Hence, including less covariates in 
the analyses presented in table 5.3, does not explain the difference.  
 
Table 5.3  Year 1: Effect of supplementary grant on the financial parental contribution (N=3902) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental contribution         
Financial    -0.640***    -0.488***    -0.421***    -0.399*** 
    (0.029)    (0.027)    (0.028)    (0.029) 
         
Control  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Parental income  NO  NO  LINEAR  POLYNOMIAL 
         
* Significant at a 10% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include a cohort dummy variable. 
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In table 5.4 we narrow the windows around the cut-off of being eligible. The first column shows 
our initial full model estimate. Subsequently we narrow the window to the income class €2800 
plus minus €2000 (column 2), plus minus €1000 (column 3) and plus minus €500 (column 4). 
Also here, we find similar results which improve the internal validity of the results.  
 
Table 5.4  Year 1: Effect of  supplementary grant on the parental contribution for samples near the cut-off 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental contribution         
Financial    -0.399***    -0.379***    -0.456***    -0.464*** 
    (0.0292)    (0.0305)    (0.0505)    (0.102) 
         
N  3902  3532  2105  855 
Income class   Initial regression  2800±2000  2800±1000  2800±500 
         
* Significant at a 10% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include covariates including the polynomial function of the parental income, and year dummies.  
 
5.2  Second approach: longitudinal analysis  
5.2.1  Results Determinants of participation in higher education  
 
For our second approach, defined in equation (3), we use the parental income of year 1 as proxy 
for the parental income of year 2. Figure 5.3 presents the average supplementary grant of year 2 
as function of the parental income of year 1. The figure shows a similar pattern as in figure 5.2.  
 










Table 5.5 shows the   32 
estimates when using the second identification strategy. In the first column we regress the 
parental contribution on only the supplementary grant, the lagged parental contribution and a 
dummy variable for the two years. Column 2 additionally includes the control variables. 
Column 3 adds the lagged parental income and in column 4 a third order polynomial of the 
lagged parental income is also included. The full model estimation results imply that financial 
parental contribution decreases with around 33 cents for every additional euro spent on 
supplementary grant, which is not far of the estimate of -40 cents in table 5.3. Hence, the results 
are robust to the inclusion of the lagged parental contribution which controls for unobserved 
individual fixed effects. The estimation results provide additional evidence for the negative 
effect of the supplementary grant on the financial parental contribution. 
 
Table 5.5  Year 2: Effect of supplementary grant on financial parental contribution (N=1806) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental contribution         
Financial    -0.376***    -0.357***    -0.338***    -0.329*** 
    (0.033)    (0.034)    (0.035)    (0.037) 
         
Lagged value of FPC  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Control  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Lagged parental income   NO  NO  LINEAR  POLYNOMIAL 
         
* Significant at a 10% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include a cohort dummy variable. 
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6  Sensitivity tests  
This section presents several sensitivity tests. For the sensitivity tests and heterogeneity checks 
in the next section, we use the dataset of the Student Monitor. This dataset contains more 
observations, and is extended with administrative data about the size of the grants.  
 
The first column in table 6.1 shows the initial full model estimation results. In columns 2 till 4 
we address the influence of possible outliers. One concern in our previous analyses might be the 
arbitrary decision to exclude students that report to receive a monthly total parental contribution 
of €1500 or more. To investigate whether this choice affects our results, we perform some 
sensitivity tests. In the second model we restrict the sample to students that receive less than 
€800. In the third model we exclude students with a parental contribution that exceeds 40% of 
total net parental income, which also seems unrealistic. Estimation results are quite similar to 
the initial regression results. Column 4 presents the estimates of a median regression. Rather 
than minimizing the sum of the squared residuals (as within the OLS), the median regression 
minimizes the sum of the absolute value of the residuals. In that way, the influence of outlying 
observations is reduced. The result for the total parental contribution hardly changes, while we 
find a lower degree of substitution for the financial parental contribution.  
 
Table 6.1  Sensitivity tests 
    Excluding outliers  Non-compliance  Excluding zeros   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Parental contribution                 
Financial  -0.230***  -0.197***  -0.204***  -0.107***  -0.217***  -0.242***  -0.222***  -0.213***  -0.232*** 
  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.0284)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
                   
Total  -0.597***  -0.529***  -0.545***  -0.611***  -0.568***  -0.535***  -0.573***   -0.573***  -0.628*** 
  (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.0467)  (0.032)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
                   
N  12051  11408  11646  12051  9329  3572  10839  7101  5694 
Check  Initial   TPC<800  TPC<0.4*I  Median   I≤4900  S>0 & 
I≤4900  
TPC>0  FPC>0  Aggregate   
 
 
Another potential bias may be caused by the students that are eligible for the supplementary 
grant but do not apply for this. There may be unobservable differences between the group of 
students that is eligible and applies for the grant and the group of students that is eligible but 
does not apply. This issue is addressed in models 5 and 6. In these models we restrict the 
estimation sample to the eligible students and to the eligible students that receive a 
supplementary grant, respectively. The intuition behind these analyses is as follows. In our main   34 
estimations, variation in the supplementary grant can arise from both differences in parental 
financial capability and differences in appliance. First of all, the parental financial capability 
determines eligibility to the grant. Second, within the group of eligible students, financial 
capability determines the size of the grant. Third, within the group of eligible students, non-
appliance causes variation in the supplementary grant. If we find similar results in both 
robustness analyses and our main analysis, this implies that the source of variation does not 
affect the estimated effect of the supplementary grant on parental contribution. In column 5 we 
restrict the sample of students to all students that should be eligible to the supplementary grant 
on the basis of figure 5.1. More precisely, we restrict the sample to the students that report an 
average income class of € 4900 or less.  In the main analysis, receiving a grant depends on both 
eligibility (and hence financial capability) and appliance behaviour.  In model 5, variation in 
obtaining a grant only comes from non-appliance: all students should be eligible and only non-
appliers do not receive the supplementary grant. We find similar estimation results which 
suggest that non-appliance does not bias our estimation results. In model 6 we further restrict 
the sample to the students that are below the cut-off value of parental income and receive the 
supplementary grant. Hence, we only include eligible applicants. This means that we only use 
the variation in the size of the grant (that comes from differences in financial capability) to 
identify the effect on parental contribution. The estimation results presented in column 6 are 
also very comparable, suggesting that non-appliers do not bias our estimation results.  
 
An additional concern is the large proportion of students that report a (financial/total) parental 
contribution of zero, as shown in figure 4.1 (a) and (b). In columns 7 and 8 we exclude these 
observations to test whether our results are affected by the large group of zero observations. A 
comparison with the initial regression shows that the results are nearly the same.  
 
Finally, in column 9, we estimate the regression for the students that reported the aggregated 
income instead of the income of both parents separately. The results are similar to our initial 
regression. Hence, the focus on students that report the income of the mother and father 
separately does not influence our results.  
 
Summarizing, the main results are robust for a number of sensitivity checks. Each additional 
euro on supplementary grant reduces the financial parental contribution with approximately 20 
cents, and the total parental contribution with approximately 60 cents. 
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7  Heterogeneity checks  
The results presented so far suggest that receiving grants decreases the parental contribution. 
Another question is whether this effect differs for specific subgroups, such as female versus 
male students, students living at home or independently, or students in higher vocational 
education versus students in university education. In this section we investigate this question, 
by estimating some models that are an adjusted form of equation (2), that is, 
 
(4)  0 1 2 3 4 5 () i i i i i i i i PC S DS D f I X                
 
where  i D  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to the subgroup 
under consideration and 0 otherwise. This model implies that the effect of the supplementary 
grant on the parental contribution is given by  12    for individuals that belong to the 
subgroup, whereas it equals  1   if the student does not belong to the subgroup. By modelling it 
in this way we assume that the effect of the covariates does not depend on the subgroup 
(otherwise interaction terms should be included). 
Table 7.1  Effect of the supplementary grant on the parental contribution for subgroups (N=12051) 
         
  Year  Gender  Living situation  Level of education  
D=0 ( 1  )  Freshman  Female  with parents  higher vocational 
D=1 ( 1  + 2  )  Senior  Male  independent  university 
         
Parental contribution         
Financial  1      -0.126***    -0.232***    0.026    -0.110*** 
       (0.034)    (0.022)    (0.027)    (0.024) 
  2      -0.132***    0.004    -0.394***    -0.224*** 
      (0.036)    (0.029)    (0.030)    (0.029) 
           
Total  1      -0.488***    -0.616***    -0.299***    -0.472*** 
      (0.054)    (0.036)    (0.042)    (0.038) 
  2      -0.139***    0.041    -0.459***    -0.234*** 
      (0.058)    (0.046)    (0.048)    (0.046) 
         
* Significant at a 10% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include covariates including the polynomial function of the parental income, and year dummies.  
 
Table 7.1 shows the regression results. The first column shows that the degree of substitution is 
higher for senior students, as the interaction term  2 ()  is significantly negative. For freshmen 
each additional euro on supplementary grant decreases the financial parental contribution with 
0.13 cents and total parental contribution with 0.46 cents. On the contrary, the financial 
contribution decreases with 0.26 cents and the total contribution with 0.64 cents for senior   36 
students. For gender we do not find a difference in the degree of substitution. In the last two 
columns the interaction terms are significant negative. This means that the degree of 
substitution is larger for students that live independently from their parents and students that are 
enrolled in university education. Hence, our estimation results suggest that the degree of 
substitution is larger for students that are more independent.   37 
8  Conclusion and discussion  
Prior investigations of grants have focussed on attendance decisions, the likelihood of 
matriculation and students‟ performance. To our best knowledge no study has yet analysed the 
effect of grants on parental contribution. Understanding the parental behaviour will contribute 
to a more profound discussion on supplying grants. If substitution takes places - meaning that 
part of the subsidy ends up with the parents -, then the financial aid system which is meant to 
support the student is not entirely effective.  
 
This paper focuses on the effect of the supplementary grant on the parental contribution in the 
Netherlands. The supplementary grant is meant to support students from disadvantaged 
families. Students with the supplementary grant have parents with less disposable income and 
therefore it is expected that they get a lower parental contribution. Our identification strategy 
separates this income effect from the effect due to the payments of the supplementary grant. We 
use two identification strategies in which we make use of the eligibility rule for the grant to 
determine the effect of the supplementary grant on parental contribution. 
 
Our results indicate that parents decrease their contribution due to the supplementary grant. 
That is, each additional euro spent on supplementary grant reduces the financial parental 
contribution with approximately 20-40 cents and the total parental contribution with 60 cents. 
This result suggests substantial substitution effects related to providing financial aid to students, 
which implies that subsidizing students implicitly boils down to subsidizing parents to some 
extent. If the goal of the supplementary grant is to support the students from disadvantaged 
families, then our empirical findings suggest that this system is partly ineffective.  
 
We perform a broad set of sensitivity analyses which all yield similar results and support our 
main findings. Nevertheless, as we rely on self-reported data and cannot completely rule out 
potential selection effects, some caution in interpreting the results seems appropriate. 
The substitution effect we find might be (partly) induced by the way the financial aid system is 
organised by the government. If a student applies for the supplementary grant, the government 
determines the „affordable amount‟ of the parents and consequently communicates it to them. 
Parents receive a letter in which the affordable amount they are expected to contribute is 
explicitly written down. The fact that the government informs the parents about the amount of 
money they are expected to give may induce a decrease in parental contribution in itself. Hence, 
we cannot rule out that the substitution effect is caused by providing information to the parents 
about their expected contribution rather than by providing additional financial resources to the 
students. 
    38 
 
Further research may investigate the underlying mechanisms of substitution of parental 
contribution in the current system of the supplementary grant. To what extent is substitution 
induced by provision of additional resources to the students, and to what extent is it induced by 
the provision of information on the affordable amount? This question could be addressed by 
means of an experiment, in which a randomly assigned part of the student‟s parents obtains 
information, while the other part of the student‟s parents does not. If providing information 
would (partly) cause the decrease in parental contribution, then the efficiency of the current 
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